![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
sla165Operations Ellamy and Odyssey Dawn: Day 4 Libyan Battle Assessment
Libya - Day 4 - with intent clear, second phase of international mission aims to formalise command structures and integrate a broad range of partners
In a time-frame that was, by the standard of previous UN debates, lightning fast, the ratification of Resolution 1973 has dramatically instigated an international military operation to stop the internal suppression of the Libyan revolt. Mandated to execute “all necessary measures” required to stop the onslaught of the state military against civilians, including the beleaguered rebel-held stronghold of Benghazi, the response by North American and European forces has been far more robust than commentators predicted.
How has this operation unfolded so far, and what political and strategic considerations will influence how the coalition deployment progresses?
Signaling intent - the initial phase
For the three primary backers of the intervention (France, the UK and US), the clear strategic imperative has been for a rapid and robust display of force. Whilst the mere passing of Resolution 1973 strikes a massive blow to Gaddafi’s claims of legitimacy, by placing the responsibility to cease attacks firmly on his shoulders, the internal military balance of power remains in his favour. The previous fortnight has seen rebel forces pushed back almost 200km to the outskirts of Benghazi, hounded by aerial attacks, armour and artillery. Worse still, previous evidence of bombardment at Zawiya and Misratahas indicated that the regime has few qualms about bombarding urban areas prior to an assault.
The anticipated attack on Benghazi has thus necessitated a decisive start to the intervention. The chosen enforcement method has become a mixture of long-range missile and fighter strikes, accompanied by a persistent air presence comprised of available French, Canadian, US and UK aircraft.
The aerial component has been spearheaded by French assets, based an hour’s flight away at Solenzara, Corsica. A mixed squadron of around twenty French Dassault Rafale and Mirage 2000D fighter jets, supported by at least one AWACS surveillance aircraft, have carried out several combined strikes in the vicinity of Benghazi. After executing SEAD, RSEAD and planned strike missions, this mixed-bag formation now appears to be operating on a reactive strike profile, engaging forces as they are located. Though none of Gaddafi’s air forces have been seen since the arrival in-theatre of coalition forces, the French formation has destroyed numerous ground targets gathering for an attack on Benghazi. A concentrated attack on the city has since failed to materialise.
To effectively extend this dominating presence to the rest of the country, numerous coalition assets have been targeting Libya's air defense systems, including SA-2, SA-3 and SA-5 surface-to-air guided missiles, and their guidance radars. Command and control (C2) centres, including a bunker within Gaddafi’s own compound in Tripoli, and reinforced air force munitions bunkers, were also targeted. Whilst preceded by largely symbolic long-range British Tornado GR4 raids, launched from RAF Marham, and attacks by US B-2 stealth bombers based in Missouri, the bulk of these targets have now been destroyed by far more significant naval firepower.
In the heaviest concentration of conventional ordinance since the infamous “shock and awe” campaign over Baghdad in 2003, a total of 124 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired on the 20th of March alone. A British Trafalgar Class nuclear submarine, 2 US Arleigh Burke class Destroyers and 3 other American attack submarines are believed to have delivered these strikes based on aerial and satellite obtained intelligence. Though the US has confirmed that many SA-6 and SA-8 mobile missile launchers will still need to be located and engaged, these attacks are widely understood to have significantly degraded, if not completely neutralised, the missile-based anti-air capacity of Gaddafi’s troops.
With Gaddafi’s ability to resist aerial incursion essentially removed, the imposition of the no-fly zone successful and the defeat of Benghazi unlikely, this deployment of firepower appears to have achieved its short term objectives.
Building the mission - partnerships and command
The intense strikes (70-80 sorties on the 21st alone) witnessed so far will not continue indefinitely, with the movement of assets to Italian air bases and a lower tempo of operations likely in the coming week. The challenge of the second phase of this intervention will be to successfully build the mission up into a formalised routine for air patrols and missions.
An important part of this process will be the integration of more coalition partners. A wide-range of nations have agreed to join the existing members, including Denmark, Spain, Italy, Norway, Belgium, Qatar and the UAE.
At the time of writing, around 34 additional aircraft appear to be en-route or preparing to deploy to one of 7 southern Italian air bases assigned for the use of the coalition forces. The French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle is also en-route, with an undefined number of helicopter and fast-jet capabilities aboard. Otherwise, the majority of contributions by European partners will be airfield-based F-16s or Tornado ground attack aircraft, although at least one aerial tanker and several CN-235 maritime surveillance planes have also been pledged.
The arrival of these diverse assets will deliver two key advantages to the campaign:
bringing more aircraft onto patrol rotations
helping with the division of labour for specialised functions such as aerial refueling
The overall number of aircraft is already impressive at such short notice, and future contributions have not been ruled out. Despite the fears of many, European states are producing the force they need to match their commitments.
The assignment of overall operational command and control (C2) will also need to be formalised, though this may prove more problematic. At present, the coalition is de-facto US led, to the extent that US assets, especially the Blue Ridge class command ship Mount Whitney, are providing the C2 backbone of current operations. However, Washington has been wary of fully “owning” proceedings, and has made it clear that formal command will be handed on to an unspecified “coalition” leadership at some point in the coming week. Indeed, the Obama administration has been widely observed to be following UK and French pressure over Libya, without clearly articulating their own strategic interest in the mission.
This leaves the operation in an uncomfortable command limbo. On Monday, the Norwegian defence minister indicated that his country’s jets would not be used until this issue had been resolved. Whilst the obvious candidate would be a NATO mission structure, the objections of Turkey (who has voiced concerns about the operation) and Germany (who abstained from the UN vote) complicate this politically. Intense negotiations are ongoing, and whilst French sources have expressed optimism that NATO will take up the role shortly, it is by no means certain.
The next best option, and possibly the most likely, would be a joint Anglo-French command. The arrival of the Charles de Gaulle, which could provide an ideal hub for C2 coordination, as well as the recent defence cooperation treaty signed between Paris and London, would certainly make this an ideal second-choice. Yet, whilst Anglo-French forces are certainly the most experienced and battle-worthy in Europe, their experience in operating together in the last decade has been restricted to NATO C2 structures. Without them, it is unclear how easily they could coordinate a dozen contributing air force missions. Therefore, at the time of writing, the overall mission command remains un-defined.
The very near future
Worryingly, this lack of command clarity may point to some of the more problematic elements of the emerging campaign. From US reticence to NATO grumbling, the assertiveness of the campaign so far in terms of deployed force belies a lack of strategic direction. As historically bombing campaigns can at best push towards political concession (Kosovo), or at worst, actively toughen up a regime’s resistance to outside pressures (1990’s Iraq), the coalition is going to need to consider how to commit in the long-term to the fulfillment of their UN mandate to protect.
Reinforcing international perceptions of legitimacy will be vital in this regard. The involvement of Qatar and the UAE is particularly significant. Sustained aerial bombardment will inevitably lead to unintended civilian casualties, bringing with it international scrutiny. Though the exact assets being committed are unclear, having Arab jets fly as part of the campaign will remind onlookers that this is an internationally mandated UN missions, not US or European unilateralism.
Maintaining a positive public image is an important political imperative because, inevitably, it will be sustained involvement that defines the final outcome. Obama’s reticence to support a UN mandate, described as “slow like a fox” for it’s deliberately cautious fostering of global opinion, has led to a decidedly late arrival of Western force. The rebels were on the verge of defeat. This has been sharply reversed, but US caution remains. Washington refuses to lead from the front, and it has fallen to France and the UK to assert the confidence that a war-sceptical US administration lacks.
But as the campaign progresses, the continued investment of equipment, manpower and treasure will call for political unity and a single-mindedness of purpose. Reverses or upsets, such as a civilian casualty incident or a downed aircraft could yet un-settle contributing governments. Gaddafi could yet hold on – he has indeed continued to do so since 1986. So as jets continue to fly and the bombs continue to fall, solidarity and political engagement may prove more important then these initial successes.
Update: as of 1215 GMT, US oficials have confirmed that a USAF F-15E has crashed in Libya. Both crew members have ejected - one has been recovered safely and the second is standing by for recovery.
Jonathan Dowdall writes for Defence Dateline Group
http://www.defenceiq.com/air/articles/operations-ellamy-and-odyssey-dawn-day-4-battle-as/&mac=DFIQ_OI_Featured_2011&utm_source=defenceiq.com&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DefOptIn&utm_content=3/22/11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Если вкратце то это отчет за 4 день бомбардировок Ливии на английском.Да на английском но только лишь потому что встроенный гугл переводчик выдает только лишь перевод слов а не смысла как такового то есть вот пример:
Обновление: по состоянию на 1215 GMT, США oficials подтвердили, что ВВС США F-15E разбился в Ливии. Оба члена экипажа имеют выбрасывается - одна была возвращена безопасно, а второй стоял на выздоровление.
Жесть,да?
Libya - Day 4 - with intent clear, second phase of international mission aims to formalise command structures and integrate a broad range of partners
In a time-frame that was, by the standard of previous UN debates, lightning fast, the ratification of Resolution 1973 has dramatically instigated an international military operation to stop the internal suppression of the Libyan revolt. Mandated to execute “all necessary measures” required to stop the onslaught of the state military against civilians, including the beleaguered rebel-held stronghold of Benghazi, the response by North American and European forces has been far more robust than commentators predicted.
How has this operation unfolded so far, and what political and strategic considerations will influence how the coalition deployment progresses?
Signaling intent - the initial phase
For the three primary backers of the intervention (France, the UK and US), the clear strategic imperative has been for a rapid and robust display of force. Whilst the mere passing of Resolution 1973 strikes a massive blow to Gaddafi’s claims of legitimacy, by placing the responsibility to cease attacks firmly on his shoulders, the internal military balance of power remains in his favour. The previous fortnight has seen rebel forces pushed back almost 200km to the outskirts of Benghazi, hounded by aerial attacks, armour and artillery. Worse still, previous evidence of bombardment at Zawiya and Misratahas indicated that the regime has few qualms about bombarding urban areas prior to an assault.
The anticipated attack on Benghazi has thus necessitated a decisive start to the intervention. The chosen enforcement method has become a mixture of long-range missile and fighter strikes, accompanied by a persistent air presence comprised of available French, Canadian, US and UK aircraft.
The aerial component has been spearheaded by French assets, based an hour’s flight away at Solenzara, Corsica. A mixed squadron of around twenty French Dassault Rafale and Mirage 2000D fighter jets, supported by at least one AWACS surveillance aircraft, have carried out several combined strikes in the vicinity of Benghazi. After executing SEAD, RSEAD and planned strike missions, this mixed-bag formation now appears to be operating on a reactive strike profile, engaging forces as they are located. Though none of Gaddafi’s air forces have been seen since the arrival in-theatre of coalition forces, the French formation has destroyed numerous ground targets gathering for an attack on Benghazi. A concentrated attack on the city has since failed to materialise.
To effectively extend this dominating presence to the rest of the country, numerous coalition assets have been targeting Libya's air defense systems, including SA-2, SA-3 and SA-5 surface-to-air guided missiles, and their guidance radars. Command and control (C2) centres, including a bunker within Gaddafi’s own compound in Tripoli, and reinforced air force munitions bunkers, were also targeted. Whilst preceded by largely symbolic long-range British Tornado GR4 raids, launched from RAF Marham, and attacks by US B-2 stealth bombers based in Missouri, the bulk of these targets have now been destroyed by far more significant naval firepower.
In the heaviest concentration of conventional ordinance since the infamous “shock and awe” campaign over Baghdad in 2003, a total of 124 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired on the 20th of March alone. A British Trafalgar Class nuclear submarine, 2 US Arleigh Burke class Destroyers and 3 other American attack submarines are believed to have delivered these strikes based on aerial and satellite obtained intelligence. Though the US has confirmed that many SA-6 and SA-8 mobile missile launchers will still need to be located and engaged, these attacks are widely understood to have significantly degraded, if not completely neutralised, the missile-based anti-air capacity of Gaddafi’s troops.
With Gaddafi’s ability to resist aerial incursion essentially removed, the imposition of the no-fly zone successful and the defeat of Benghazi unlikely, this deployment of firepower appears to have achieved its short term objectives.
Building the mission - partnerships and command
The intense strikes (70-80 sorties on the 21st alone) witnessed so far will not continue indefinitely, with the movement of assets to Italian air bases and a lower tempo of operations likely in the coming week. The challenge of the second phase of this intervention will be to successfully build the mission up into a formalised routine for air patrols and missions.
An important part of this process will be the integration of more coalition partners. A wide-range of nations have agreed to join the existing members, including Denmark, Spain, Italy, Norway, Belgium, Qatar and the UAE.
At the time of writing, around 34 additional aircraft appear to be en-route or preparing to deploy to one of 7 southern Italian air bases assigned for the use of the coalition forces. The French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle is also en-route, with an undefined number of helicopter and fast-jet capabilities aboard. Otherwise, the majority of contributions by European partners will be airfield-based F-16s or Tornado ground attack aircraft, although at least one aerial tanker and several CN-235 maritime surveillance planes have also been pledged.
The arrival of these diverse assets will deliver two key advantages to the campaign:
bringing more aircraft onto patrol rotations
helping with the division of labour for specialised functions such as aerial refueling
The overall number of aircraft is already impressive at such short notice, and future contributions have not been ruled out. Despite the fears of many, European states are producing the force they need to match their commitments.
The assignment of overall operational command and control (C2) will also need to be formalised, though this may prove more problematic. At present, the coalition is de-facto US led, to the extent that US assets, especially the Blue Ridge class command ship Mount Whitney, are providing the C2 backbone of current operations. However, Washington has been wary of fully “owning” proceedings, and has made it clear that formal command will be handed on to an unspecified “coalition” leadership at some point in the coming week. Indeed, the Obama administration has been widely observed to be following UK and French pressure over Libya, without clearly articulating their own strategic interest in the mission.
This leaves the operation in an uncomfortable command limbo. On Monday, the Norwegian defence minister indicated that his country’s jets would not be used until this issue had been resolved. Whilst the obvious candidate would be a NATO mission structure, the objections of Turkey (who has voiced concerns about the operation) and Germany (who abstained from the UN vote) complicate this politically. Intense negotiations are ongoing, and whilst French sources have expressed optimism that NATO will take up the role shortly, it is by no means certain.
The next best option, and possibly the most likely, would be a joint Anglo-French command. The arrival of the Charles de Gaulle, which could provide an ideal hub for C2 coordination, as well as the recent defence cooperation treaty signed between Paris and London, would certainly make this an ideal second-choice. Yet, whilst Anglo-French forces are certainly the most experienced and battle-worthy in Europe, their experience in operating together in the last decade has been restricted to NATO C2 structures. Without them, it is unclear how easily they could coordinate a dozen contributing air force missions. Therefore, at the time of writing, the overall mission command remains un-defined.
The very near future
Worryingly, this lack of command clarity may point to some of the more problematic elements of the emerging campaign. From US reticence to NATO grumbling, the assertiveness of the campaign so far in terms of deployed force belies a lack of strategic direction. As historically bombing campaigns can at best push towards political concession (Kosovo), or at worst, actively toughen up a regime’s resistance to outside pressures (1990’s Iraq), the coalition is going to need to consider how to commit in the long-term to the fulfillment of their UN mandate to protect.
Reinforcing international perceptions of legitimacy will be vital in this regard. The involvement of Qatar and the UAE is particularly significant. Sustained aerial bombardment will inevitably lead to unintended civilian casualties, bringing with it international scrutiny. Though the exact assets being committed are unclear, having Arab jets fly as part of the campaign will remind onlookers that this is an internationally mandated UN missions, not US or European unilateralism.
Maintaining a positive public image is an important political imperative because, inevitably, it will be sustained involvement that defines the final outcome. Obama’s reticence to support a UN mandate, described as “slow like a fox” for it’s deliberately cautious fostering of global opinion, has led to a decidedly late arrival of Western force. The rebels were on the verge of defeat. This has been sharply reversed, but US caution remains. Washington refuses to lead from the front, and it has fallen to France and the UK to assert the confidence that a war-sceptical US administration lacks.
But as the campaign progresses, the continued investment of equipment, manpower and treasure will call for political unity and a single-mindedness of purpose. Reverses or upsets, such as a civilian casualty incident or a downed aircraft could yet un-settle contributing governments. Gaddafi could yet hold on – he has indeed continued to do so since 1986. So as jets continue to fly and the bombs continue to fall, solidarity and political engagement may prove more important then these initial successes.
Update: as of 1215 GMT, US oficials have confirmed that a USAF F-15E has crashed in Libya. Both crew members have ejected - one has been recovered safely and the second is standing by for recovery.
Jonathan Dowdall writes for Defence Dateline Group
http://www.defenceiq.com/air/articles/operations-ellamy-and-odyssey-dawn-day-4-battle-as/&mac=DFIQ_OI_Featured_2011&utm_source=defenceiq.com&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DefOptIn&utm_content=3/22/11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Если вкратце то это отчет за 4 день бомбардировок Ливии на английском.Да на английском но только лишь потому что встроенный гугл переводчик выдает только лишь перевод слов а не смысла как такового то есть вот пример:
Обновление: по состоянию на 1215 GMT, США oficials подтвердили, что ВВС США F-15E разбился в Ливии. Оба члена экипажа имеют выбрасывается - одна была возвращена безопасно, а второй стоял на выздоровление.
Жесть,да?
